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We show that all proposed quantum bit commitment schemes are insecure because the sender,
Alice, can almost always cheat successfully by using an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen type of attack and
delaying her measurement until she opens her commitment.
PACS Numbers: 89.70.+c, 03.65.Bz, 89.80.+h
Work on quantum cryptography was started by S. J.
Wiesner in a paper written in about 1970, but remained
unpublished until 1983 [1]. Recently, there have been
lots of renewed activities in the subject. The most well-
known application of quantum cryptography is the so-
called quantum key distribution (QKD) [2–4], which is
useful for making communications between two users to-
tally unintelligible to an eavesdropper. QKD takes ad-
vantage of the uncertainty principle of quantum mechan-
ics: Measuring a quantum system in general disturbs it.
Therefore, eavesdropping on a quantum communication
channel will generally leave unavoidable disturbance in
the transmitted signal which can be detected by the legit-
imate users. Besides QKD, other quantum cryptographic
protocols [5] have also been proposed. In particular, it is
generally believed [4] that quantum mechanics can pro-
tect private information while it is being used for public
decision. Suppose Alice has a secret x and Bob a secret
y. In a “two-party secure computation” (TPSC), Alice
and Bob compute a prescribed function f(x, y) in such a
way that nothing about each party’s input is disclosed to
the other, except for what follows logically from one’s pri-
vate input and the function’s output. An example of the
TPSC is the millionaires’ problem: Two persons would
like to know who is richer, but neither wishes the other
to know the exact amount of money he/she has.
In classical cryptography, TPSC can be achieved ei-
ther through trusted intermediaries or by invoking some
unproven computational assumptions such as the hard-
ness of factoring large integers. The great expectation
is that quantum cryptography can get rid of those re-
quirements and achieve the same goal using the laws of
physics alone. At the heart of such optimism has been
the widespread belief that unconditionally secure quan-
tum bit commitment (QBC) schemes exist [6]. Here we
put such optimism into very serious doubt by showing
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that all proposed QBC schemes are insecure: A dishon-
est party can exploit the non-local Einstein-Podolsky-
Rosen (EPR) [18] type correlations in quantum mechan-
ics to cheat successfully. To do so, she generally needs
to maintain the coherence of her share of a quantum sys-
tem by using a quantum computer. We remark that all
proposed QBC schemes contain an invalid implicit as-
sumption that some measurements are performed by the
two participants. This is why this EPR-type of attack
was missed in earlier analysis.
Let us first introduce bit commitment. A bit com-
mitment scheme generally involves two parties, a sender,
Alice and a receiver, Bob. Suppose that Alice has a bit
(b = 0 or 1) in mind, to which she would like to be
committed towards Bob. That is, she wishes to provide
Bob with a piece of evidence that she has already chosen
the bit and that she cannot change it. Meanwhile, Bob
should not be able to tell from that evidence what b is.
At a later time, however, it must be possible for Alice
to open the commitment. In other words, Alice must be
able to show Bob which bit she has committed to and
convince him that this is indeed the genuine bit that she
had in mind when she committed.
A concrete example of an implementation of bit com-
mitment is for Alice to write down her bit in a piece of
paper, which is then put in a locked box and handed
over to Bob. While Alice cannot change the value of the
bit that she has written down, without the key to the
box Bob cannot learn it himself. At a later time, Alice
gives the key to Bob, who opens the box and recovers the
value of the committed bit. This illustrative example of
implementation is, however, inconvenient and insecure.
A locked box may be very heavy and Bob may still try
to open it by brute force (e.g. with a hammer).
What do we mean by cheating? As an example, a
cheating Alice may choose a particular value of b during
the commitment phase and tell Bob another value during
the opening phase. A bit commitment scheme is secure
against a cheating Alice only if such a fake commitment
can be discovered by Bob. For concreteness, it is instruc-
tive to consider a simple QBC protocol due to Bennett
and Brassard [2]. Its procedure goes as follows: Alice and
Bob first agree on a security parameter, a positive integer
s. The sender, Alice, chooses the value of the committed
bit, b. If b = 0, she prepares and sends Bob a sequence
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of s photons each of which is randomly chosen to be ei-
ther horizontally or vertically polarized. Of course, the
value of b is kept secret during the commitment phase.
Moreover, the actual polarization of each photon chosen
by Alice is not announced to Bob. Similarly, if b = 1, she
prepares and sends Bob a sequence of s photons each of
which is randomly chosen to be either 45-degree or 135-
degree polarized but once again the actual polarization
of each photon is kept secret by Alice. Bob chooses ran-
domly between the rectilinear (horizontal and vertical)
and diagonal (45-degree or 135-degree) bases to measure
the polarization of each photon. This completes the com-
mitment phase. A simple calculation shows that, the two
density matrices describing the s photons corresponding
to b = 0 and b = 1 respectively are exactly the same (and
are proportional to the identity matrix). Consequently,
Bob cannot learn anything about the value of b.
At a later time, Alice may open her commitment by
announcing the value of b and the actual polarization of
each of the s photons. Since Bob has chosen his ba-
sis (rectilinear or diagonal) of measurement randomly
for each photon in the commitment phase, on average,
only half of the s photons, have been measured by him
in the correct basis. For those photons, Bob can verify
that Alice’s announced polarizations match his measure-
ment results. Baring EPR attacks, a cheating Alice may,
for example, send rectilinear photons in the commitment
phase (hence commits to b = 0) but tell Bob that they are
diagonal photons in the opening phase (hence announces
b = 1). This is cheating. Alice then has to make ran-
dom guess for the polarizations of the photons that Bob
has measured along the diagonal basis. Since Bob, on
average, measures s/2 photons along the diagonal basis,
Alice, with such a cheating strategy, has only a probabil-
ity of (1/2)s/2 for success. See [7] for details.
A key weakness of Bennett and Brassard’s scheme is
that Alice can always cheat successfully by using EPR-
pairs. Alice can prepare s EPR-pairs of photons and
send a member of each pair to Bob during the commit-
ment phase. She skips her measurements and decides on
the value of b only at the beginning of the opening phase.
If she chooses the value of b to be 0, she measures the
polarization of the photons in her share along the recti-
linear basis. It is a standard property (the EPR paradox)
of an EPR pair that Alice’s measurement result on a pho-
ton will always be perpendicular to Bob’s result on the
other photon of the pair. Alice can, therefore, proudly
announce those polarizations. Similarly, for b = 1, she
simply measures along the diagonal basis and proceeds
in a similar manner. There is no way for Bob to detect
this attack.
Bennett and Brassard noted this weakness in the same
paper in which they proposed their scheme [2]. Nonethe-
less, new QBC schemes have been proposed and it has
been generally accepted in the literature [4,7,8] that they
defeat an EPR-type of attack. Our goal here is to demon-
strate that, contrary to popular belief, precisely the same
type of EPR attack defeats all proposed QBC schemes.
All proposed schemes involve only one-way communi-
cations from Alice to Bob. On the conceptual level, they
all involve Alice sending two quantum systems to Bob,
one during the commit phase and the other during the
opening phase. [There is no loss of generality in our anal-
ysis in considering quantum communications alone since
classical communications is just a special case of quantum
communications.] More precisely, the general procedure
of any proposed QBC scheme can be rephrased in the
following manner:
(1) Alice chooses the value of a bit b to which she would
like to be committed towards Bob. If b = 0, she prepares
a state
|0〉 =
∑
i
αi|ei〉A ⊗ |φi〉B , (1)
where 〈ei|ej〉A = δij but the normalized states |φi〉B’s
are not necessarily orthogonal to each other. Similarly,
if b = 1, she prepares a state
|1〉 =
∑
j
βj |e′j〉A ⊗ |φ′j〉B , (2)
where 〈e′i|e′j〉A = δij but |φ′j〉B ’s are not necessarily or-
thogonal to each other.
Both Alice and Bob are supposed to know the states
|0〉 and |1〉. This implies, in particular, that both of them
know the states |φi〉B and |φ′j〉B.
(2) An honest Alice is now supposed to make a mea-
surement on the first register and determine the value of
i if b = 0 (j if b = 1).
(3) Alice sends the second register to Bob as a piece of
evidence for her commitment.
(4) At a later time, Alice opens the commitment by
declaring the value of b and of i or j.
(5) Bob performs measurements on the second register
to verify that Alice has indeed committed to the genuine
bit. More precisely, the data received from Alice (the val-
ues of b and also i or j) should be correlated with Bob’s
experimental results on the second register. If such ex-
pected correlations do appear, Bob accepts that Alice has
executed the protocol honestly. Otherwise, Bob suspects
that Alice is cheating.
We emphasize that all proposed QBC schemes follow
the five-step procedure described above. For instance,
Bennett and Brassard’s scheme described earlier falls into
this class if we give Bob the liberty to store up his photons
and measure them only after the opening (step 4) of the
commitment by Alice. But, if Alice can cheat against
even such a powerful Bob, clearly she can cheat against
Bob who has no such storage capability.
Our proof of insecurity of QBC goes as follows: First of
all, in order that Bob cannot tell what b is, the second reg-
ister (the quantum system that Bob receives during the
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commit phase) must contain very little information about
which bit Alice has committed to. As a start, let us con-
sider the ideal case in which the second register contains
absolutely no information about the value of b. [Bennett
and Brassard’s scheme [2] and Ardehali’s scheme [9] are
ideal whereas Brassard and Cre´peau’s scheme [7] and the
most well-known BCJL scheme [8] are non-ideal. We will
come to the non-ideal case near the end of this Letter.]
In the ideal case, to ensure that Bob has no information
about the committed bit b, the density matrices describ-
ing the second register associated with the bits 0 and 1
are the same. i.e.,
TrA|0〉〈0| ≡ ρB0 = ρB1 ≡ TrA|1〉〈1|. (3)
It then follows from the Schmidt decomposition [19]
that
|0〉 =
∑
k
√
λk|eˆk〉A ⊗ |φˆk〉B, (4)
and
|1〉 =
∑
k
√
λk|eˆ′k〉A ⊗ |φˆk〉B, (5)
where {|eˆk〉A}, {|eˆ′k〉A} and {|φˆk〉B} are orthonormal
bases of the corresponding Hilbert spaces and λk’s are the
eigenvalues of the reduced density operator, TrA|0〉〈0| =
TrA|1〉〈1|. Notice that the λk’s and |φˆk〉B’s are the same
for the two states and the only difference lies in Al-
ice’s system |eˆk〉A’s vs |eˆ′k〉A’s. Now consider the unitary
transformation UA which maps |eˆk〉A to |eˆ′k〉A. It clearly
maps |0〉 to |1〉. Note that the transformation UA acts on
Alice’s system alone and yet rotates |0〉 to |1〉. That is,
Alice can apply UA without Bob’s help. Therefore, Alice
can cheat by changing b = 0 to b = 1 in the opening
phase.
More concretely, consider the following cheating strat-
egy: In the first step, Alice always prepares |0〉 corre-
sponding to b = 0. She then skips the second (mea-
surement) step and sends the second register to Bob as
prescribed in the third step. She decides on the value
of b to announce only in the beginning of the opening
phase (step 4). Should she now choose b to be zero,
she executes the protocol honestly. On the other hand,
if she now chooses b to be one, she applies the unitary
transformation UA to rotate |0〉 to |1〉 and executes the
protocol for b = 1 instead. Consequently, Alice can al-
ways cheat successfully. Notice that Alice is able to cheat
primarily because she can delay her measurement until
step four. To do so, Alice generally needs a quantum
computer. While it is a challenging technological feat to
build a quantum computer, it is not forbidden by the
laws of quantum physics. The possibility of a dishonest
Alice skipping the second step (i.e., delaying her measure-
ments) was not considered in Ref. [8]. This was the chief
reason why earlier researchers came to the erroneous con-
clusion that the BCJL scheme is provably unbreakable.
In the above discussion, we have assumed the ideal sit-
uation in which Bob has absolutely no information about
the value of b during the commitment phase and hence
the density matrices describing the second register for
the two cases b = 0 and b = 1 are the same. (See Eq.
(3).) However, Brassard and Cre´peau’s scheme [7] and
the BCJL scheme [8] are non-ideal in the sense that they
violate Eq. (3) slightly and give Bob some probability of
distinguishing between ρB
0
and ρB
1
. Intuition seems to
indicate that this is not going to change our conclusion:
On the one hand, if Bob has a large probability of dis-
tinguishing between the two states, the scheme will be
unsafe against a cheating Bob. On the other hand, if
Bob has only a very small probability of distinguishing
between the two states, clearly the two density matrices
ρB
0
and ρB
1
must be close to each other in some sense and
essentially the same physics should apply.
Following Mayers [20], we now consider the non-ideal
case when ρB
0
6= ρB
1
. The closeness between two states
of B specified by the two density matrices ρB
0
and ρB
1
,
is commonly described by the concept fidelity [21] which
can be defined in terms of purifications. Imagine a system
A attached to Bob’s system B. There are many pure
states |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉 on the composite system such that
TrA (|ψ0〉〈ψ0|) = ρB0 and TrA (|ψ1〉〈ψ1|) = ρB1 .
(6)
The pure states |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉 are called the purifications
of the density matrices ρB
0
and ρB
1
. The fidelity can be
defined as
F (ρB
0
, ρB
1
) = max|〈ψ0|ψ1〉| (7)
where the maximization is over all possible purifications.
0 ≤ F ≤ 1. F = 1 if and only if ρB
0
= ρB
1
. We remark
that for any fixed purification of ρB
1
, e.g. |1〉 in Eq. (2),
there exists a maximally parallel purification of ρB
0
which
satisfies Eq. (7).
For non-ideal QBC schemes, the fact that Bob has a
small probability for distinguishing between ρB
0
and ρB
1
means that [20]
F (ρB
0
, ρB
1
) = 1− δ (8)
for some small δ > 0. It then follows from Eqs. (7) and
(8) that, for the state |1〉 given in Eq. (2), there exists a
purification |ψ0〉 of ρB0 such that
|〈ψ0|1〉| = F (ρB0 , ρB1 ) = 1− δ. (9)
The strategy of a cheating Alice for a non-ideal bit
commitment scheme is the same as before. She prepares
the state |0〉 corresponding to b = 0 in the first step, skips
the second (measurement) step and sends the second reg-
ister to Bob as prescribed in the third step. She decides
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on the value of b only in the beginning of the opening
phase (step 4). If she now chooses b = 0, she simply
follows the rule. If she chooses b = 1, she applies a uni-
tary transformation to the quantum system on her share
to obtain the state |ψ0〉 which satisfies Eq. (9). Such a
unitary transformation exists because, as can be seen in
the Schmidt decomposition [19], all purifications |φ〉AB
of a fixed density matrix ρB are related to one another
by unitary transformations acting on A alone and A is in
Alice’s hands. Notice that if Alice had been honest, she
would have prepared |1〉 in the first step instead. (See
Eq. (2).) Nonetheless, since |ψ0〉 and |1〉 are so similar to
each other (See Eq. (9).), Bob clearly has a hard time in
detecting the dishonesty of Alice. Therefore, Alice can
cheat successfully with a very large probability.
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Notes added: The insecurity of the BCJL scheme [8]
has also been investigated independently by Mayers [20].
More recently, Mayers [22] has generalized the above re-
sult to prove that all quantum bit commitment schemes,
including ones that involve two-way (quantum) commu-
nications between Alice and Bob, are insecure. The same
result and the impossibility of ideal quantum coin toss-
ing are discussed in our recent preprint [23]. The im-
possibility of some other quantum protocols has recently
been demonstrated by Lo [24]. These surprising discover-
ies constitute a major setback to quantum cryptography.
The exact boundary to the power of quantum cryptog-
raphy remains an important subject for future investiga-
tions.
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